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RATIONAL INT ERPRETATION IN IRRAT IONAL TIMES
: THE THIRD
GENEVA CONV ENTION AND THE "WAR ON TERROR"

I.

INTRODUCTION

White House Counsel Alberto Gonzalez has noted his belief that in the
context of the "War on Terror," the Geneva Conventions of 19491 have been
made obsolete. 2 Victoria Clarke, a senior Pentagon spokeswoman, has taken
a less political position, stating recently that in light of the events of Sep
tember 11, 2001 and their aftermath, the Geneva Conventions "should be
looked at with new eyes. " 3 Though similar in that they suggest the United
States should have greater flexibility in the administration of its military
aims with respect to terrorism, these two comments implicate drastically
different approaches t o the relationship between international humanitarian
law and military necessity. Did the Geneva Conventions become instantane
ously obsolete with the impact of planes into the World Trade Center and
Pen tagon? T hi s Recent Development argues against that very proposition.
International humanitarian law, specifically the provisions of the Geneva
Convention (No. III] Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (the
"Third Geneva Convention") that deal with the questioning of prisoners4
and their repatriation at the end of hostilities,5 is sufficiently flexible to ac
commodate tactics in the War on Terror, while still adequately protecting
detainees at war. Both the text of the T hird Geneva Convention and exam
ples of state practice demonstrate that particular provisions of the Third Ge
neva Convention may be interpreted to address military considerations while
still respecting the general principles of the Geneva Conventions.
II. RELEVANT BACKGROUN D

In September 2001, terrorists associated with al-Qaeda and supported by
the Taliban government in Afghanistan attacked the World Trade Center
and Pentagon, prompting a military response from the United States in Af
ghanistan. Suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters captured during the
FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED
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U.S.-led campaign were transported to a U.S. naval base in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. There, the detainees were housed in Camp Delta (formerly Camp
X-Ray), a detention facility originally intended for Cuban and Haitian boat
people; some detainees have remained at Camp Delta since then.6 From the

outset, the U.S. administration denied the detainees Prisoner of War (POW)

status under the Third Geneva Convention. However, in an official policy
document, the Department of State concluded that while the Taliban

was

never recognized by the U.S. as the legitimate government of Afghanistan,
its members were still covered by the Geneva Convention. 7 By contrast, al
Qaeda was "not a state party to the Geneva Convention; it is a foreign ter
rorist group ... [and] as such its members are not entitled to POW status."8
III. THE INDETERMINACY OF HUMANITARIAN LAW
The events at Camp Delta illustrate pressure by other states to apply in
ternational law. The initial U.S. position o n the detainees was to deny the
applicability of the Third Geneva Convention altogether. President Bush

termed the detainees "killers" and "terrorists. "9 Reactions among states in
the international community to the U.S. position and the detainment in
Guantanamo were significant. International criticism came from a variety of
sources, including the European Union, the Netherlands,10 and the United
Kingdom.l1 In response to these criticisms, the United States altered its
approach. An official State Department policy brief, written shortly after

such criticism began to surface, assured that detainees would be treated "in a
manner consistent with the principles of the Third Geneva Convention of

1949."12

This change of policy showed that the United States was constrained in
its actions. Arguably, it is an instance of the Geneva Convention treaty re

gime functioning as it was intended, with third states' reactions consticut

ing fulfillment of their responsibility to take all steps necessary under the

6. Julian Borger, Human Rights Protest as POWs Arrive at U.S. Base, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Jan. 12, 2002,
http://www.guardian.co.uklinternational/story/0,3604,631519,00.html. The numbers at Camp Delta
have swelled fro m 20 in January 2002, ro 598 at the time of this writing; facilities are being constructed
for an expected 2000 inmates. s� u.s. to Move Cuba Base Detainees if Storm Nears, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Sept.
25, 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,798630,00. html.
7 U.S. Department of State Policy Document, Status ofDetainees at Guantanamo, Feb. 7, 2002, http://
www.state.gov/p/salrls/fs/791 Opf.htm.
8. ld.
·

9. BBC News Online, Bush Reconsiders Prisoners' Rights, Jan. 29, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/
_
en �ltsh wor d/americas/ne wsid_l788000/1788062.st m (stating that norms and
values needed to be
mamtamed m the "War on Terror").
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10. �BC News Online, E. U. Presses U.S. on Prisoner Rights, Jan.
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.
hi/engltsh/world/amenca s/newsid_l77400011774237 .stm.
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Third Geneva Convention.13 It is also evidence of a dynamic application of
compliance created by the treaty regime.14 A unilateral interpretation of the
Third Geneva Convention bears the same legal weight as interpretation by
another state party to the Third Geneva Convention that is not involved in
the conflict. For this reason criticisms by ocher states do not undermine the
sovereignty of the state at which they are directed.15 The pressure generated

by other states' interpretations on a state to revise its opinion regarding the
applicability of the Third Geneva Convention,16 may act as an enforcement
mechanism.
Criticism of U.S. policy died down following positive assurances that it
would apply humanitarian law, if not grant actual POW status, to Guan
ranamo detainees. This Recent Development proposes that a state's freedom

of interpretation within the Geneva Convention treaty regime is relatively
broad, but is subject to general assent from the international community,
which may hinge on considerations of both international law and politics. In
short, the United States could have avoided international criticism and pre
served political capital had it applied international humanitarian law from
the outset in the current situation.
The indeterminacy of the threshold of application of international hu
manitarian law allowed the United States to take the position it ultimately
did in the current conflict. Under one reading of the Third Geneva Conven
tion, the captured combatants may be "POWs" under the Third Geneva
ConvencionY However, even if the detainees qualify as POWs, it is difficult
for the international community to verify whether the requirements im
posed by article 4 have been met, as the detaining agent will almost always
be an active party to the conflict. In the absence of fact-finding by an objec
tive body, any determination on an unclear point of law will necessarily be
clouded b y the prevailing interests of the detaining power. The fundamental
principles of international humanitarian law ensure base level protections
within loose rules. This Recent Development examines specific provisions of
the Third Geneva Convention to show that POW status ultimately could

13. Jochen
248 RECUEIL

A. Frowein, Reactions by Not Directly Affected States to
DES (OURS

345, 396 (1994). See also

Breaches of Public International

Law,

Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Luigi Condorelli,

Comm011 Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions Revisited: Protecting Collective Interests, 82 INT'L REV. RED CROSS
67,67-87 (2000). See THIR D GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 1.
14. See, e.g., ABR AM (HAYES & ANTONI A HANDLER (HAYES , THE NEw SovEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGUL ATORY AGREEMENTS (1995).
15. Rene Provost, buieterminacy and Characterization in the Application of Humanitarian Law, in THE
NEW WORLD ORDER: SoVEREIGN TY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SELF DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES 177,
197 (Mortimer Sellers ed., 1996).
16. ld. at 200; Asylum Case, (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 274 (Nov. 20).
17. The broad scope of article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, which deals with those who are en

tided to POW status, could arguably encompass the detainees of the Afghanistan conflict. Tho� gh the
_
armed opposition met by U.S. troops did not conform with strict conceptions of military orgamzanon,
the detainees could have qualified for POW status as "members of the armed forces of a Party to the
conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.'" See THIRD GE
NEVA CONVENTION, supra note

1, art. 4 (emphasis

added).
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have been given to detainees while still enabling the United States to collect
information from the detainees for use in the War on Terror.
IV. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF HUM ANITARIAN LAW AND THEIR
CRU CIAL ROLE IN INTERPRETATION

The indeterminacy and ambiguity of rules of humanitarian law are not
confined to the rules on status of detainees. Substantive provisions of hu
manitarian law treaties often rely on fundamental guiding principles of hu
manitarian law in case of ambiguity as to the treaty's proper application.
Furthermore, when ambiguity exists, ty pically the ambiguity is read to
broaden, rather than limit, the scope of application of the rule. These ele
ments display a base level of protection within the law for those placed

de combat.

hors

The U.S. attempt to limit the scope of the Third Geneva Conven

tion by deny ing POW status to the Camp Delta detainees was not in accor
dance with the principles of international humanitarian law.
Even without considering the interpretation of the Third Geneva Conven
tion, the detainees would be covered by what are best termed "general prin
ciples" of humanitarian law, 18 such as those contained in the Martens
Clause.19 The Martens Clause was originally formulated within the Hague
Regulations of 1899 as follows:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Con
tracting Parties chink it right to declare that in cases not included in
the regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain
under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they
result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the
laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience. 20 (em
phasis added)
The Martens Clause has since been incorporated in article 142 of the Third

Geneva Convention and several other humanitarian law instrum ents.21 The

18. The Third Geneva Convention encapsulates humanitarian ideals. The "humanitarian and civilis
ing object and purposes" of the Geneva Conventions have been used to argue that the rules contained
therein are of a "higher" character. See Georges Abi-Saab, The Specificities of Humanitarian Law, in STUDIES
AND ESSAYS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN HONOUR OF
JEAN PICTET 265, 272 (Charles Swinarski ed., 1984).
19. This notion was affirmed in Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., Case No. IT-95-16, Trial Chamber Judg
ment, ,- 524 (Jan. 14, 2000). See also Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 194 9, in 2b
DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS FOR PROTEC
TION OF VICTIMS OF WAR 71-72 (Berne 1949). In the drafting of the Geneva Conventions, the Special
Committee supplemented article 129 of the draft text with the Martens Clause, despite concerns by the
French, Finnish, British, and U.S. representatives as to its superfluous nature. ld.
20. CONVENTION RESPECTING THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON lAND, July 29, 1899, pmbl.,
32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 [hereinafter HAGUE CONVENTION].
21. ld.; PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL I TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, June 8,
1977, pmbl., a� .1, 1125 U._N.T.S. 25 [hereinafter ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I]. Although the Martens
_ the Thud Geneva Convention is laid down in relation to denunciation of the ConClause formulatton m
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"requirements of public conscience" or "elementary considerations of hu
manity"22 are not meant to be solid rules of governance but rather interpre
tative guides. I t has been suggested that the reference to the laws of human
ity refers to "those human rights standards that have been laid down in in
ternational instruments such as the Universal Declaration (of Human
Rights]."23 Such an approach affirms that there are general principles "of
invaluable importance at the interpretative level"24 co guide a state applying
the laws of war.
The rule of proportionality is a classic example of an instance where a
wide measure of discretion is left to the state. The rule requires that, in the
course of military operations, attacks shall be prohibited if civilian loss of
life or damage to civilian objects would be "excessive in relation to the con
crete and direct military advantage anticipated."25 The compromise here is
between human suffering and military utility, and while the formulation in
Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 ("Ad
ditional Protocol I") provides "quite detailed guidance" when compared
with the jus in bello prior to the adoption of that instrument,26 the require
ments are still uncertain. Effective application of such a vague rule requires
"complete good faith on the part of the belligerents, as well as the desire to
conform with the general principle of respect for the civilian population."27
The intent of the drafters of Additional Protocol I to rule out any excessive
civilian losses,28 fills out the rule's meaning. Protection of the civilian popu
lation must always be the overriding consideration. 29
Indeterminacy has been deliberately employed in drafting rules of hu
manitarian law to broaden the potential scope of application of a provision.

vencion, it is still an indication that the humanitarian object and purpose resulting in the Convention are
the codification of the "laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience" which would serve to fill
any gaps left by that treaty. Rudolf Bernhardt,

TIONAL LAw 326 (1994).

Martens Clause, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA

22. The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr.

9); Legality of a Use by a Stare of

Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 257 Guly 8).
23. Antonio Cassese, The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?, 11
187, 207 (2000).

EuR. ] . INT'L. L.
See also Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level (Can. Ministry of De

fense) Office o f the Judge Advocate General, Doc. B-GG-005-027/AF-020 0999), hnp://www.
forces.gc.caljag/operational_pubs_e.hrml.

24 . Cassese, supra note 23.
25. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I, supra note 21, art. 51(5Xb).
26. GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE 325 (Methuen 1983) (1980). The Geneva Conventions
of 1949 made no explicit reference to the rule of proportionality.
27. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977

TO THE GENEVA CONVEN
TIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 � 625 (Claude PiJloud et aJ. eds., 1987) [hereinafter ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
CoMMENTARIEs}.
28. Id. , 1980. No military advantage, however large, would justify "excessive" collateral loss of ci
vilians or civilian property, according to the drafters.

29. See EDWARD KWAKWA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF ARMED CONFLICT: PE RSONAL AND MATE
RIAL FIELDS OF APPLICATION 39 (1992). (describing the Third Geneva Convention as "particularly im
portant as a principle of civilian protection"). But see Peter Rowe, Kosovo 1999: The Air Campaign-Have
the Provisions of Additional Protocol/ Withstood the Test?, 82 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 147, 147-64 (2000)
(concerning the UK's position in relation to the NATO campaign in Kosovo).
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For instance, in order to trigger the protections of Protocol Additional II to
the Geneva Convention of

12

August

1949,

and Relating to the Protection

of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts ("Additional Protocol II")

to the Geneva Conventions, an armed force must be capable of carrying out
"sustained"

and

"concerted"

military

operations.30

These

criteria

were

adopted in place of more stringent requirements that would have specified
levels of "intensity " of the "duration" of operations.31 Because such narrow
ing language was rejected, application of the provisions should be read
broadly. This teleological interpretation of the Third Geneva Convention is
very much at odds with the initial U.S. position on detainees at Camp Delta.
The Martens Clause demonstrates the continuing relevance of humani
tarian law "regardless of subsequent developments of types of situation or
technology."32 The significance of September

11

and the War on Terror have

undeniably affected the international community, but they have not ren
dered the Geneva Conventions obsolete. On the contrary, the guiding prin
ciples of international humanitarian law facilitate their continued applica
tion and interpretation.
V. SPE CI FI C PROVISIONS WITHIN THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION

Application of humanitarian principles to concrete situations requires an
understanding of the object and purpose of each principle. Debate on the
efficacy and meaning of the Geneva Conventions has focused on the Third
Geneva Convention. For foreign detainees being held by the United States
under the auspices of the War on Terror, the resolution of the POW status
question will significantly impact the responsibilities owed by the United
States to the detainees in Guantanamo.
The United States used the perceived vagueness of the Third Geneva
Convention in this area to read articles 4 and

5

to conclude that Geneva

Convention protections do not apply to the detainees.33 This position allows

the United States to selectively apply Geneva Convention protections with-

30. PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL II TO THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AND RELATING
TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, June 8, 1977, art. 1,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609, [hereinafter ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II}.
31. See Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflicts, Report of the Work of the Conference, Geneva, Switzerland, 2d Sess.,
at 68 0972). The more stringent requirements would have demanded specific levels of "intensity"
"duration."
32.

or

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL COMMENTARIES, supra note 27, , 55. From its origins, the clause has

remained

as

protection against large military powers controlling the content of the laws of war. See

Rupert Ticehurst,
(1997).

The Martens Clause and the Laws ofArmed Conflict, 317 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 125, 134

33. The Unit �d States claims that even though many detainees do not qualify for such protections,
.
they are bemg gtven nearly all the protections that would be provided under the Third Geneva Conven
tion. The United States is making a distinction between the protection granted to al-Qaeda and Taliban
members, though neither the mechanics nor the effects of the distinction are clear. See Andrea Kannapell,

February 3-9; Front Lines, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, S4, at 2 .
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out hindering U.S. military aims. This selective application of the Third
Geneva Convention is of questionable validity.
The United States' reluctance to grant POW status to the detainees is
based on U .S. concerns about interference with interrogation and repatria
tion as well as a general concern about how application of the Third Geneva
Convention would impact the War on Terror. However, an examination of
articles 1 7 and 18 of the Third Geneva Convention shows that the goals of
the United States can be met while still respecting the Third Geneva Con
vention.
A. Article 17: Limitations on Infotmation Secured by Prisoners

Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give
only his surname, first name and rank, date of birth and army, regimen
tal, personal or serial number, or failing this equivalent information.34
The United States consistently argued that article 1 7 specifications were
unacceptable obstacles to its ability to thwart future terrorist attacks. 35 This
Recent Development argues that under a proper interpretation of article 17,
while a POW is not required to provide information beyond name, rank,
and serial number, a detaining power is not prevented from asking questions
beyond that scope. However, the humanitarian concerns underlying the
creation of article 17 may direct recognition of certain interrogatory meth
ods.
The interpretation that article 17 permits interrogation of POWs only as
to the information specified therein is supported by the assertion of some
international law scholars that Geneva Convention rights include a "right
not to be interrogated or coerced into providing information."36 However,
article 1 7 does not prohibit interrogation but rather delineates information
that the prisoner must provide at pains of the restriction of privileges that
otherwise may accompany his rank or statusY By limiting the tactics avail
able to elicit responses, the Geneva Convention implicitly acknowledges
that interrogations of a prisoner are expected and inevitable .38

34. THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 1, act. 17.
35. Kenneth Roth, Bush Policy Endangers American and Allied Troops, INT'L H ERA LD ThiB., Mar. 5,

2002, at 7; Thorn Shanker & Katherine Q. Seelye, Behind the Scenes Clash Led Bush to Reverse Himself on
Applying Geneva Conventions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at A12 ("By denying captives the full Geneva

protections, the administration said, it could more thoroughly interrogate them to uncover future terror
ist plots ... ).
"

36. Marjorie Cohn, Editorial, Having It Both Ways on Detainees, SAN DIEGO UNION ThiB.,

Feb.

10,

2002, at G3. See generally Weekend Edition Sunday (National Public Radio broadcast, Jan. 27, 2002) (on file
with the Harvard International Law Journal).
37. See THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 17.
38. Id. First, "no physical or mental rorrure, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on pris

oners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever." Id. Second, "[p)risoners of war who
refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment
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Furthermore, the traveaux preparatoires of article 1 7 support the view
that detaining powers are not prohibited from interrogating prisoners. The
notes of the Special Committee involved i n the drafting describe that "[i]t
was idle to harbor illusions. A state which had captured prisoners of war
would always try to obtain military information from them."39 Instead of
banning interrogation, article 17 was designed to "inform [POWs] of the
legal consequences of a refusal to answer. "40
Given that interrogation is inevitable, the question becomes what limita
tions on interrogation must be applied to the current U.S. detainees. How
ever, prohibition of interrogating tactics poses a dilemma. If a detaining

power is allowed to question prisoners, but is not allowed to engage in "co
ercion" or utilize "unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind,"
what type of interrogation tactics may be used?41 Deciphering this puzzle
requires an examination of the article's history and commentary.
The framers of the Third Geneva Convention worked coward two objec
tives in drafting article

17: (1) eliminating torturous questioning; and

(2) increasing efficiency and accuracy in keeping track of soldiers captured
by the enemy.42 The circumstances surrounding the Third Geneva Conven
tion's enactment leave little room for doubt as to these objectives. During
World War II, over 60,000 Soviet-held POWs died of hunger, torture, and
neglect.43 Similarly, thousands of Allied POWs were forced to do back
breaking labor that often led to death.44 In Germany, many POW s were
held in unofficial interrogation camps prior to being sent to the government
sponsored POW camps.45 In these unofficial camps, soldiers were beaten and
intentionally placed outside of the influence and protection of the Interna
tional Committee of the Red Cross.46 Following the Nazi collapse and sub
sequent Allied occupation of Germany, British forces created "Direct Inter
rogation Centres" where torture tactics included naked solitary confinement
in sub-freezing temperatures. 47

of any kind." !d.
39. Preparatory Works of the Geneva Convention, 5th Meeting of Committee II, Friday

29 April 1949, in

DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS, supra note 19,
at 251.
40. Id.
41. See THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 1,

att.

17.

42. See generally, jEAN DE PREUX, GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISON
ERS OF WAR: COMMENTARY, 155-M (A.P. de Henry trans., 1960)
43. See Marjorie Miller, Germany
46.

Takes New Look at Buchenwald's History,

L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1994, ac

44. See A Bill to Preserve Certain Actiom in Federal Court Brought by Members of the United States Arrnul

Forces Held as Pri�oners of War byjapan During World War II: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Immigration, Border

Secrmty, and Clarms of the House Comm. on the judiciary, 1 07th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Robert D.
McCallum, Jr.).
45. See, e.g., DE PREUX, supra note 42, at 163.
46. Id.

47 Christopher Hudson, Under the British jackboot: Rape, Torture, Execution
and the Horrors of Interroga
. Camps,
tion
DAILY MAIL (U.K.), Aug_ 25, 2001, at 28.
·
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In the Third Geneva Convention, the drafters responded to the events of
World War II and noted in their commentary to article 17 that they "were

not c ? nrenc to c �nfirm the 1929 text."48 Instead, they explicitly prohibited
the kmd of physiCal and mental torture that had occurred in the Soviet Un
ion and Germany. They also broadened the scope of the prohibition on inter
r?gacive coercion from interrogation undertaken to reveal military informa

tion to chat undertaken to reveal "information of any kind whatever."49 The

requirement chat soldiers provide identifying information enables the de
taining power to maintain accurate records of the number and identity of
the prisoners detained. This purpose is reinforced by requirements that each
captured soldier carry an identification card and that the detaining power
report rhe identification of the prisoners detained to the prisoner's home
country.�0 These identification requirements in part encourage more humane
treatment. Furthermore, the requirements provide transparency designed to
heighten accountability of each state for its treatment of enemy soldiers
during and at the conclusion of hostilities.
The protection against coercion in article 17 of the Third Geneva Conven
tion, broadly framed to prohibit torture, i s the other potential obstacle to
effective interrogation. POW s "may not be threatened, insulted," or "ex
posed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment"

as

a result of failure to

answer interrogatory questions.51 The impact of this broad provision is
twofold. First, physical and mental abuse, or threats of such abuse, are
clearly not allowed during an interrogation under the Third Geneva Con
vention, but also under customary international law and various human
rights instruments. 52 Second, the requirement of equal treatment ensures
that the detaining power does not engage in tactical favoritism, creating
conflict among those detained.
State practice reinforces an interpretation of the Third Geneva Convention
that allows for reasonable interrogation. There are numerous examples of

�

state practice in this area that have been widely viewe

as conformi g to
�
article 17 requirements. These examples of state practiCe bear promment

legal significance in the interpretation of treaties. 53 Exa� ples of state pr c
�
tice that can inform the interpretation include the detention of Army Chtef
Warrant Officer Michael Durant by a Somali warlord in 1993 and the deten-

the 19�9 te�t required only a regimen
4S. DE PREUX, supra note 42, at 163. The framers noted tha�
.
_

tdenttficauon and mearungful recordtal number and that such information was inadequate for effecnve

kee:;��d.

states had coerced information from POWs re
A reason listed for this change was that some
lating ro personal information of relatives.
50. See DE PREUX, supra note 42, at 163.
17.
51. THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note
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cion of U. S . Army Chief Warrant Officer Bobby Hall by North Korea in

1994.
The capture and subsequent interrogation of Michael Durant during a
failed U.S. operation in Somalia against warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed
demonstrated the broad legal applicability of the Third Geneva Conven
tion's protections despite vague language. Following Durant's capture, the
United States demanded assurances that his treatment would be consistent
with the broad protections afforded under the Third Geneva Convention.
Under a strict interpretation of the Third Geneva Convention's applicability,
Durant's captors would not be bound to follow the convention because they
were not a "state."54 Additionally, coverage under the Third Geneva Conven
tion would allow Aideed to lawfully detain Durant until the end of hostili
ties. Nonetheless, the United States successfully argued that the captors
were required to follow the Third Geneva Convention because breach of
these protections would result in liab ility under customary law for Aideed.
Following these declarations by the United States, heavy-handed interro
gations of Durant appeared to cease, the Red Cross was allowed to visit him
and observe his treatment, and he was subsequently released by Aideed as a
"gesture of goodwill. "55 The treatment and subsequent release of Michael
Durant show the impact of the Geneva C onventions even where actual de
tention may be unlawful.
Currently the situation is reversed: the United States is the captor of indi
viduals associated with non-state parties that are not encompassed in the
Third Geneva Convention. The U.S. response, and the opposition's accep
tance of U . S . demands, to Durant's capture are instructive for determining
the appropriate actions to be taken by the United States with respect to the
Guantanamo detainees. The Durant case demonstrates that governments
demand that the protections of the Geneva Convention b e given to detain
ees, even if the actual detention is viewed as unlawful. The adherence to the
Third Geneva Convention's protections absent its benefits for the detaining
state (the right of capture and non-release until the end of hostilities) reveals
that compliance with the Third Geneva Convention does not depend on
reciprocity. If the Third Geneva Convention protections are binding on So
mali warlords, non-state parties must be granted the same protection. More
importantly, Durant's captors could not reject the Third Geneva Convention
obligations because these obligations interfered with the captors' goals.
Aideed did not possess significant intelligence-gathering operations or in
side information of U.S. operations. Prior to Aideed's apparent capitulation'
to follow the Third Geneva Convention's protections, Aideed's men engaged
in a thuggish interrogation of Durant, which culminated with two flesh

54. Indeed, encouraging treatment of Durant under the Third Geneva Convention would have im
pli �idy im lied that Aideed posses �ed a right ro lawfully hold U.S. troops or U.N. peacekee pers. See
Ke1th B. R1chbur , Somalta Battle Ktlled 12 A1nericans, Wounded 78, WASH. PosT, Oct. 5, 1993, at Al.

?
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55. ld. Durants release c a me on October 14, 1993, eleven days after his capture.
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wounds inflicced by gunfire into Durant's arm.56 However, Aideed's subse
quenc treatment of Durant and Durant's ultimate release demonstrate
Aideed's adherence, albeit reluctant, to the protections of the Third Geneva
Convention.
The capture and treatment of Bobby Hall i s also illustrative of how the
Third Geneva Convention has been applied i n practice. Hall and another
U.S. pilot, David Hilemon, inadvertently entered North Korean airspace
due co navigational error and were subsequently shot down by North Ko
rean forces.�7 Hilemon died in the crash, but Hall was quickly captured
and detained for questioning.58 During his detention, Hall was not tor
cured or maltreated i n any way.59 However, he was interrogated by North
Korean authorities on both military and personal matters.6° Under the
circumstances of Hall's capture, it is uncertain whether he was a POW
owed the protections under the Third Geneva Convention. The pivotal
question was whether the United States and North Korea were engaged in
"armed conflict. "61 Despite questionable applicability of the Third Geneva
Convention, the North Koreans informed Hall that he would be treated as
a POW.62 According to a Pentagon briefing following Hall's release less
than three weeks later, Hall "was well treated in North Korea. He was well
fed, got some rest," and "was under no physical duress to sign the statement."63
Despite Hall's cooperation with North Korean interrogators, arguably in
violation of the U.S. Military Code of Conduct,64 no disciplinary proceed
ings were brought against him. Under a broad reading of "coercion" in the
Third Geneva Convention, North Korea's questioning, which culminated in
a statement labeled "confession," violated article 17. However, the United
States did not claim that the questioning by North Korea constituted coer
cion, and instead noted that Hall's ultimate willingness to sign the state
ment was due co the " natural" stresses that accompany capture by a hostile
power.65 According co Hall himself, he was not subjected to any physical or

56. ld.
57. Leanora Minai, A Soldier's Story, ST. PETERS. TIMEs, Jan. 5, 1995, at lA.
58. /d.
59. ld.
Korea, AGENCE FR.-P�ESS, Jan. 5, 1995.
60. Helicopter Pilot Says He Didn't Know He Was 01ler
61. Hall was found in a U.S. uniform emblazoned wtth symbols of the Umted States, possessed a
knife was found in a U.S. army helicopter, and engaged in no violation of the laws of war, generally
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mental torture, and was held in a room with a bed, bathtub, and toilet.66 If
the United States does not consider i nterrogation of a captured soldier by
the enemy state to violate the Third Geneva Convention then a similar in
terrogation of detainees by the United States should not be considered a
violation of the Third Geneva Convention.
Insisting that article 17 prohibits all forms of interrogation ignores the
purpose and spirit behind the Third Geneva Convention and renders its pro
tections counterproductive. Prohibitions o n mental and physical abuse con
tained in the Third Geneva Convention should be strictly followed. How
ever, the inherent stress of being detained by a foreign power and asked for
military information need not be eliminated, particularly when the detainee
is asked for information relating to crimes for which other enemy actors
could be lawfully tried. Such stress is a mild consequence compared to the
advantages that may be gained in preventing and punishing international
and domestic crime. An interpretation of the Third Geneva Convention that
would forbid interrogation on those subjects also fails co deal with captors'
incentives to obtain information from their detainees. If officially, interroga
tion is not allowed, then unofficial, more heavy-handed i nterrogation will
likely take place. Thus, allowing some i nterrogation more accurately reflects
the spirit and goals of the framers of the Third Conventio n . Instead of fo
cusing on whether any questioning is allowed, the debate should concern
permissible tactics of questioning under article 1 7 .
B. Article 118: The Prospect of Repatriation

Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the
cessation of active hostilities.67
Article 1 18 , providing for repatriation at the end of "active hostilities"
creates confusion i n the context of the War on Terror. The U.S. characteriza
tion of the conflict i n Afghanistan as part of a larger war on global terrorism
may be used to j ustify detention of suspected terrorists for years beyond the
end of active hostilities. On the other hand, article 118's premise that re
leased POWs will return to civilian life and will no longer present a threat
to the detaining state may not be true i n this conflict. This Part examines
this tensio n , and concludes that ultimately, the object and purpose of the
Third Geneva Convention demonstrates that such open-ended detainment is
disallowed.
The U.S. government believes that continued detention of suspected ter
rorists disrupts potential attacks that may have been planned before their
detainment. 68 Upon close scrutiny, article 1 1 8's repatriation responsibility
66. Hall was even given a television to watch North Korean movies. Minai,
supra nore 57.
67. THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 118.
68. See Risk Monitor Briefing, Department of Defense, Special Briefing
on the 2002 Unified Command
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�oes nor

present a real diffic ulty for this position. I n reality, the two main
1ssues for U .S. and international interests are: ( 1 ) how the Third Geneva
Convention's requirement of repatriation at the conclusion of hostilities
should be interpreted i n the newly minted War on Terror, and (2) the corol
lary impact on U .S . ability to try these individuals. These issues should be
resolved in accordance with the object and purpose interpretation of the
Third Geneva Convent i o n .
The repatriation of POWs i s dependent o n neither agreement between
the parries/•') nor reciprocal release of POWs b y the other side, but should
simply be undertaken once "active hostilities" have ceasedJO The definition
of "active hosti l i ties," however, is the key to the understanding of the provi
sion. According to the reasoning provided by article 1 7 's commentary, the
1 929 Convent ion was insufficient because it did not recognize that hostili
ties could cease in the absence of an armistice or peace treaty.7 1 Unfortu
nately, the alternat ive chosen by the framers of the Third Geneva Conven
tion in 1 94)) does not , on its face, properly account for the reverse situation,
in which active host ilit ies continue indefinitely. The United States has re
peatedly claimed, with j usti fication, that contin uing operations i n Afghani
stan will be necessary to extinguish the threat of remaining Taliban and al
Qaeda forces. n Furthermore, the detainees could be viewed not as prisoners
of the conflict in Afghan istan, but rather as prisoners captured i n the War on
Terror. Under this view, detention could be j us tified under the Third Geneva
Convention for potentially the rest of their lives.
Article 1 1 H 's j ustification for requiring repatriation even if there is no
formal agreement between the parties to end hostilities may suggest a long
detention is leg i t imate i n the context of terrorists.73 Unlike the World War
II context in which the Third Geneva Convention was framed, i n the present
situation, terrorist operatives being detained are likely to resume the fight
against their captors. As one commentator notes, "the right to repatriation is
based on the g e neral assumption that for the prisoner of war, repatriation
constitutes a return to a normal situation." 7 4 However, in the case of many
detainees , peacetime living is not the norm. Many ave instead cho en to be
�
_
involved in continuous operations against the Umted States and 1ts allies.
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However, this unfortunate fact only complicates the question of repatriation
and it does not fully answer it.
The tenor of the debate over the adoption of article 1 18 makes it clear
that this provision was designed to minimize unnecessary detention. 75 A
broad interpretation of "active hostilities," where U . S . detainees could con
ceivably spend their entire lives as POWs during an elusive and sporadic
War on Terror, contravenes this aim. Many of the current detainees are at
best loosely linked,76 if at all, to the continuing hostilities on which the
United States would assert its continuing right of detention.
Furthermore, the framers of the Third Geneva Convention envisioned
the detention of prisoners as balancing military need and individual free
dom. The benefit the state receives from continuing the detention de
creases over time, especially once active hostilities have ended. A detainee
possesses a limited amount of information, which becomes less relevant

as

time passes. As the military benefit of the detainees decreases and the bur
den imposed on the detainees increases, the balance of interests that justify
their detainment becomes more difficult to accept under the Third Geneva
Convention.
Contrary to popular belief, recognition of an obligation to repatriate does
not preclude criminal prosecution. Detention not only for military but for
eventual prosecutorial aims, which is part o f U.S. policy with respect to the
Guantanamo detainees, is permitted by the Third Geneva Convention. Pris
oners of war suspected of common crimes before their detainment may be
held for subsequent prosecution. Additionally, those detainees suspected of
crimes committed in other nations, such as Afghanistan or Yemen, may be
extradited to those jurisdictions for prosecutionJ7 Similarly, POWs sus
pected of war crimes such as the intentional targeting of civilians may be
prosecuted following the end of the hostilities. 78
Pure preventive incarceration of POWs, however, is contrary to the Third
Geneva Convention's protections, creating tension partially addressed by

75. ld. at 546. The commentary to article 1 1 8 notes that the conference "recognized that captivity is a
painful situation which must be ended as soon as possible and was anxious that repatriation should take
place rapidly and that prisoners of war should not be retained in captivity on various pretexts ." Id.
76. This loose linkage is an unavoidable result of the decentralized nature of many of the armed
movements against the United States.
7 7 . This possibility has been explicitly recognized , but not followed, by U.S. Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld as a possible way to end some detainees' stay in U.S. camps. See Special Briefing UCP,
supra note 68.
78. See Curtis Bradley & Jack G�ldsmith, The Comtitutional Validity of Military Commissiom, 5 GREEN
BAG 249, 256 (2001). Under this view, any detainee's participation, active or conspiratorial, with al
Qaeda operations relating to the September 1 1 attacks could be viewed as the initiation or confirmation
of an ongoing armed conflict. The attacks were preceded by numerous other terrorist activities consti
tuting a "conflict" rather than sporadic acts of violence. Many of these attacks, and undoubtedly the
September 1 1 attacks, violate the laws of war by targeting civilians. By treating the detainees as covered
under the Third Geneva Convention, the United States acknowledges an armed conflict with the Taliban
and al-Qaeda, recognizes al-Qaeda as an unconventional state-type actor, and thus ' actually bolsters its
case to use military tribunals to try the offenders.
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Noriega.79 General Manuel Noriega, the former

diCtator and leader of military forces in Panama, was captured by U . S . forces
for drug crimes under U.S. law. After determining that Noriega was entitled

�

co P W stat us, the court ruled that the United States could still prosecute
Nonega for common crimes against the United States.80 But, under U.S.
domestic law, an official charge is required for incarceration beyond active
hostilities for POW s .
The application o f the Third Geneva Convention protections to detainees
is evaluated in light of humanitarian goals shared by the framers in the face
of the inevitable tragedy of war. As such, article 17 restrictions on coercion
cannot appropriately be read co completely disallow interrogation. However,
the United States, or any other nation, should nor be allowed to pursue mili
tary aims through indefinite incarceration based on broad application of
Third Geneva Convention language.
VI . CoNCLUSION

This Recent Development has shown that the legal and political debate
over detainees held by the United States c a n be resolved through consid
eration of international humanitarian law. A large parr of humanitarian
law is indeterminate in nature, but its application is still both legally and
politically desirable. Fundamental principles of international humanitarian
law ensure basic protections within the treaty regime, while specific provi
sions allow sufficient flexibility in their application to meet intelligence
gathering requirements. This two-tier structure facilitates progressive in
terpretation, making the Geneva Conventions still relevant. A renewed
commitment by the American public and other states to the rule of inter
national law has been shown through their reactions to the events sur
rounding Camp Delta. However, the Geneva Conventions need to be
looked at in a new light-they have never been applied to a situation like
that facing t h e United States. The Geneva Conventions were originally
framed to accommodate the greatest number of conceivable situations in
armed conflict, and they can certainly apply to the War on Terror. For hu
manitarian l a w to function effectively in the face of these new threats, the
focus should be on the protections afforded by the law, rather than the
limitations it imposes upon states.
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